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Monty Hall’s three doors problem is a well-known “anomaly” in economics. It appears to be an example of a 
systematic violation of the assumption of subjects’ rationality. Many papers have studied the Monty Hall 
anomaly under different perspectives (i.e. computerizing, learning, grouping, talking, and even teaching how to 
play it), but the anomaly still survives. The most common explanation for this is that subjects are unable to 
carry out correctly the Bayesian updating necessary. Our approach is different from all previous attempts to 
explain and correct the Monty Hall anomaly, inasmuch we developed a more radical “debiasing test”. Even if 
the game remains identical in terms of probabilities and subjects task, we eliminate the necessity for any 
Bayesian updating, as our new framework does not require subjects to make any probability calculations. 
Consequently, having eliminated the cause, also the effect should have disappeared. In order to make our results 
robust, we also run an intermediate treatment. Even though we observe an evident monotonic increase in the 
switching percentage across the three treatments, as we expected (from 41.5% in the treatment that replicates 
the standard design, to 45.5% for the intermediate treatment, up to 58% in the new framework), this percentage 
remains still too low, even though no Bayesian updating is involved. These results drive us to conclude that this 
anomaly, even if attenuated by design conditions, is not a weak effect, but rather a systematic behavioural 
regularity. It could be attributed to some psychological underpinnings, such as the status quo bias. We comment 
on these, and alternative explanations, in our conclusions. 




JEL classification: C72; C91 
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1. Introduction 
Since its appearance in the literature,  Monty Hall’s three doors “anomaly” has attracted the 
attention of scientists from different fields: economists (Friedman, 1998; Page, 1998; Palacios-
Huerta, 2003; Slembeck and Tyran, 2004), statisticians (Morgan et al., 1991; Puza et al., 2005), 
psychologists (Granberg and Brown, 1995; Krauss and Wang, 2003) and others. The reason for 
such attention may be explained by the fact that this “anomaly” relies on a simple, even if 
counterintuitive, problem. There are three doors, and only behind one of them there is a big prize. 
At the beginning of the game, the  player is asked to choose just one door. After that, an empty door 
among the not chosen doors is opened and the player is asked to make a new decision: either to 
stick with the first chosen door or to change and choose the remaining not-opened door. If people 
performed the Bayes’ updating correctly, they should realise that switching is the best strategy 
because it doubles the percentages of winning (as we show in the next section). Nevertheless, the 
stylised fact from the American TV programme in which this game was firstly  performed, and 
from the controlled experiments that replicated its basic structure (Friedman, 1998; Page, 1998; 
Palacios-Huerta, 2003; Slembeck and Tyran, 2004) is that only a low  percentage of people choose 
to switch.  
The aim of this paper is to contribute to understanding the possible reasons for which the people fail 
to adopt the best strategy, even in an environment in which they perform the task repeatedly. Our 
experimental results drive us to conclude that the most common reason for this anomaly, that is, the 
misapplication of Bayes’ rule, even if it contributes undoubtedly in reducing the anomaly, is not the 
only nor the most important reason for it.   
The paper is structured as follows. In sections 2 and 3, we will introduce the problem and we will 
present the new experimental design, respectively. In section 4 our results will be presented. In 
section 5 some possible explanations will be proposed. Finally, in section 6, we will draw some 
conclusions. 
 
2. The problem 
Monty Hall’s three doors is an extremely simple game.  First, subjects are asked to choose one of 
three doors, that are equally likely to hide a big prize. Consequently, the first chosen door has a 
probability of one third, whereas the two left doors taken together have a probability of two thirds 
hiding the prize. Moreover, if we consider the remaining two doors, we know that with probability 
1, one of them is surely empty. Then, when one of the two left doors is opened, knowing precisely 
which one is empty does not add any relevant information, and does not affect the probability that 
the first chosen door hides the prize or the probability that the prize is behind the not chosen pair.   3
Nevertheless, it seems that the players are generally unable to recognize this. This is one of the most 
crucial points in the Monty Hall anomaly, since it is directly related to the issue in decision-making 
concerning the manner in which people process new information and update beliefs. It is well-
known that in the Monty Hall game the optimal strategy is to switch. This follows from a direct 
application of Bayes’ rule: let us label the three doors A, B and C and assume a subject chooses 
door A. Additionally, Monty opens door B (that is an empty door, and the subject knows the door 
will be opened is empty). Now we can calculate the probability of winning by switching to C given 
that Monty opened B and the probability of winning by not switching to C given that Monty opened 
B: 
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A rational subject should be able to perform this calculation and therefore he/she should choose 
always to switch. Unfortunately, this is not the case, since many subjects decide to stay with their 
first choice.  
Several possible reasons have been suggested to explain this anomaly, for example: (1) subjects 
could make mistakes in updating the relevant probabilities, i.e., they do not perform the Bayes’rule 
correctly; (2) they could suffer of the endowment effect (Kahneman et al., 1991) which captures the 
overvaluation of the winning probability of the owned door and/or the status quo bias (Samuelson 
and Zeckhauser, 1988) which is the preference to remain at the current door; (3) subjects could 
believe erroneously that the task, in addition to chance, entails some kinds of skill (in the 
psycological  literature, this belief is called illusion of control) and, therefore, they could try to 
“guess” somehow the winning door using some skill as insight, and seeing one of the two remaining 
doors empty is nothing but a reinforcement of their prior belief; (4) subjects could act following as a 
strategy the probability matching behaviour, i.e., they could decide to choose not the optimal 
startegy (always switching), but they could choose each strategy according to their relative   4
likelihood of success. In our case, this means that they should choose the two strategies, switching 
and not switching, in proportion of one third and two thirds, respectively.   
Our experimental design enables us to discriminate better among these different explanations. In 
this perspective, our approach is different, inasmuch we developed a more radical “debiasing test” 
compared to all previous experimental attempts, whose focus has been almost exclusively on some 
particular aspects that could be able to mitigate the anomaly and help people to behave rationally. 
These treatments were designed to endorse learning and to test other institutions recognized 
sensitive to anomalous choice behaviour. 
 
3. The new experimental design        
When we first approached this problem, we were puzzled, and we were moved by a simple idea: “if 
something is true there should be an easy way to explain it.” Obviously, if it is true that “switching 
the door” is better than “keeping the door”, 2/3 chance of winning is better than 1/3, then there 
should be an easy, understandable, and convincing way to demonstrate it. In order to determine this 
easy way, we modified the Monty Hall’s three doors into the Monty Hall’s three doors for 
dummies. As in the basic structure, there are three doors, and only behind one of them there is a big 
prize. Subjects are asked to choose one of the three doors, but then they are asked if they would like 
to change the door they firstly chose with both the other two doors. In this way, they should readily 
realize that we were trading off 2/3 change of winning for 1/3, and they should take advantage of 
such opportunity promptly. 
The experiment is composed by three treatments: CONTROL, INTERMEDIATE, and FOR DUMMIES. In 
the CONTROL treatment, identical to first treatment in Friedman (1998), the subject was firstly asked 
to choose a door among three. Then, an empty unchosen door was opened. Finally, the subject was 
asked to stick with to the first chosen door or to switch to the remaining unchosen door. In the FOR 
DUMMIES, subjects chose a door, and then they were asked if they wanted to change the chosen door 
with both the remaining doors. In this case, no empty door was revealed. In order to make our 
results robust for monotonicity, we also ran the INTERMEDIATE treatment, in which the only 
difference was that, after an empty door one was opened, they were asked if they wanted to keep the 
chosen door or if they wanted both the other two doors (one closed and one open). Summarizing: 
•  In the CONTROL treatment, once an empty door is opened, new information enters in the 
game and some probabilities have to be updated. All subjects should update their belief (i.e. 
the probability that the firstly chosen door hides the prize was 1/3 and it remains 1/3; the 
probability that the open door hides the prize was 1/3 and it fell to 0; the probability that the 
last door hides the prize was 1/3 and it rises to 2/3). In this treatment, it is easy to fail   5
processing correctly the new information, subjects wrongly attached to the two still closed 
doors a 50-50 chance to hide the prize. In this sense, they fail the Bayesian updating;  
•  in the INTERMEDIATE treatment, once an empty door is opened, new information enters in the 
game once again and some probabilities have to be updated as well. In this treatment, since 
the two left doors are offered coupled, performing the correct Bayesian updating is easier, 
but it is still possible to fail it and attaching to the two closed doors a 50-50 chance to hide 
the prize. 
•  In the FOR DUMMIES treatment, no door is opened, and so there is no new information 
entering the game. The Bayesian updating is not needed and so it is impossible to fail it. 
Otherwise, the three games were identical: all the relevant probabilities remained unchanged, but if 
in the CONTROL treatment subjects may fail to consider the opened and the left door as a pair, in the 
remaining treatments, they cannot fail to consider them a pair, because we offered them in pairs. 
 In this way, this simple design allowed us to establish if subjects fail the Bayesian updating, or if 
they may present some psychological underpinnings that drive them in keeping the first choice.       
The experiment was programmed using the Z-tree software of Urs Fischbacher (1999) and was run 
at the laboratory of ESSE at the University of Bari. 
Each treatment, lasting for about 45 minutes, was made up of 12 periods, 2 of which were trial 
periods. The trial periods were necessary in order to acquaint subjects with both the task and the 
computerized interface. Before the experiment was started they got the chance to ask questions 
about the experiment’s instructions. We paid particular attention in writing the instructions and in 
avoiding any possible misunderstanding and/or deception (in Appendix we provide the instructions 
for the FOR DUMMIES treatment). For example, in explaining the structure of the game, we did not 
refer to any among the three cards as the opened one. This aspect is on trial in this statement: 
“Although, semantically, Door 3 […] is named merely as an example (Monty Hall opens another 
door, say, number 3), most participants take the opening of Door 3 for granted and base their 
reasoning on this fact” (Krauss and Wang, 2003). 
In each treatment, we had N = 20 subjects, randomly assigned to the different treatments, all of 
them sat next to a PC terminal. The subjects could not see each other or communicate with the other 
subjects. Almost all of them were undergraduate students in Economics not familiar with previous 
similar experiments. 
In the experiment the task was very simple: to pick on the screen a door among three, simply 
pressing a button. For each period the programme established which door hid the prize, and the 
subjects knew this.   6
This constituted the first stage of the game, the same in all the treatments. Then a new stage began. 
In all the treatments, information about subject’s previous choice was displayed. Then, the three 
treatments diverged. In the CONTROL treatment, the programme chose and showed to the subject an 
empty door and then asked the subject if he/she wanted to keep his/her first choice or if he/she 
preferred to go for the remaining door. In the INTERMEDIATE treatment, the experimenter chose and 
showed to the subject an empty door and then asked if he/she wanted to keep his/her first choice or 
if he/she preferred the un-chosen doors (i.e. one door is opened and visibly empty, the other one is 
still closed). Finally, in the FOR DUMMIES treatment, subjects were given the opportunity to change 
the chosen door with the other two doors. In the final stage, subjects were informed about their 
chosen door(s), the right option and about their pay-off. They gained 0.5€ when they chose the 
lucky door, and zero otherwise. 
 
4. The experimental results 
Figure 1 summarizes the experimental results. It reports the switch rates in the three treatments over 
the ten periods. Comparing our CONTROL treatment with the experiments in the previous literature, 
we report an overall switch rate of 41.5%, higher than in Friedman (28.7%), however in line with 
all the other previous literature (Page, 1998; Palacios-Huerta, 2003; Slembeck and Tyran, 2004). 
The overall switch rate in INTERMEDIATE and FOR DUMMIES is 45.5% and 58%, respectively. 
Whereas there is no statistical difference between the CONTROL and the INTERMEDIATE treatment 
(Wilcoxon rank test, p = 0.4203), the FOR DUMMIES treatment is statistically different from both of 
them (Wilcoxon rank test CONTROL/FOR DUMMIES, p = 0.0010; INTERMEDIATE/FOR DUMMIES, p = 
0.0125). Therefore, we can conjecture that the FOR DUMMIES treatment could have turned out to be 
effective in shaping a different kind of behaviour, whereas the other two treatments are statistically 
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Figure 1: Switch Rate 
 
Even though we observe a higher (or, at least, not smaller) switch rate in any single period under the 
FOR DUMMIES treatment, and a monotonic increasing pattern across the three treatments as expected, 
nevertheless the switch rate in the new framework is still too low, even in the last period (when it 
reaches its maximum at 75 percent). Indeed, if the real reason for this anomaly were the 
misapplication of the Bayes’law, since the new framework did not require subjects to make any 
calculations, we should have observed a switch rate that is not different from 100 percent. At this 
point, we cannot consider the Bayesian updating failure as the leading explanation any more. We 
should look for other plausible explanations. 
Before going in to details, we show in figure 2 the categorization of our experimental subjects 
according to their different switch rate during the experiment: 
Figure 2: Categorization of subjects according to their switch rates. N = 20 in each treatment   
 
 As can be seen, even though the percentage of completely rational subjects is undoubtedly higher 




























For Dummies  8
both other two treatments, nevertheless even in this case a non negligible percentage of subjects 
never switched (3 out of 20). We now try to list some of the possible explanations of this 
behavioural pattern. 
As a first step, we test if the subjects behave randomly. In order to test this hypothesis, we run a 
one-sided binomial test in which we test as null hypothesis if the switch rate is equal to 50%, 
against the alternative hypothesis whereby the switch rate is greater than 50%. Very interestingly, 
we can reject the null hypothesis only for the FOR DUMMIES treatment (p-value = .01406), whereas 
we cannot reject the hypothesis of completely random behaviour in the CONTROL and 
INTERMEDIATE treatments (p-value = .99344 and p-value  = .91052, respectively). 
Given that probability matching behaviour has been invoked as a possible explanation for this 
anomaly, as a second step, we investigate if the switch rate is significantly different from 2/3. We 
have already underlined that, according to this hypothesis, subjects would play strategies in relation 
to their likelihood of success (and switching has 2/3 chance of winning) and not the optimal strategy 
(in this case, they should always decide to switch), as the axiom of rationality would require.  We 
can reject the hypothesis that subjects behaved according to the probability matching behaviour in 
all three treatments. 
Finally, we will follow Friedman (1998) and Slembeck and Tyran (2004) to estimate a simple 
learning model. We ran a probit model with the maximum likelihood estimation procedure. 
Specifically, we constructed a model that links the decision of switching or not with a set of 
determinants, as follows. The presence of learning is investigated by the use of the variable Time 
(the period number) and the variable Time
2, to test for concavity of learning. In order to study 
reinforcement learning (or fictitious play; Erev and Roth, 1998), we use the Switchbonus variable 
(the cumulated earnings from always switching minus the earnings from always not switching); 
directional learning (or Cournot behaviour; Selten and Buchta, 1998) is studied by using the 
Switchwon variable (a dummy variable equal to 1 if in the most recent period the subject switched 
and won) and Switchlost, (a dummy variable equal to 1 if in the most recent period the subject 
switched and lost).   9
(Note that the reported significance levels assume independent observations, though this is unlikely 
to be the case.) 
  Table1: Maximum Likelihood probit estimation
1 
Dep. Variable Switch  Friedman Run1  Friedman Run2  Slembeck-Tyran  Morone-Fiore 











-0.0539      
(0.109) 
Time




0.0044      
(0.141) 






0.0632    
(0.004) 






0.3467   
(0.000) 




0.2735   
(0.000) 
Fiedman’s treatments       
Intense  - -0.243 
(0.002) 
- - 
Track  - 0.276 
(0.009) 
- - 
Advice  - 0.337 
(0.012) 
- - 
Compare  - 0.208 
(0.069) 
- - 
Slembeck-Tyran’s treatments       
Competition  - -  0.1435 
(0.035) 
- 
Communication  - -  0.1549 
(0.022) 
- 
Comp*Comm  - -  0.0468 
(0.375) 
- 
Morone-Fiore’s treatments       
Intermediate  - -  -  0.0229   
(0.661) 
ForDummies  - -  -  0.1211   
(0.022) 
        
Log likelihood  -589.9  -927.8  -956.88  -370.95 
Pseudo R
2 -  -  0.2571  0.1073 
NOBs 1,040  1,407  1,880  600 
 
                                                 
1 The dependent variable is 1 in periods in which the subjects chose to switch, and 0 otherwise. Friedman reports the 
coefficient estimates, considering a panel structure, whereas Slembeck and Tyran, and Morone and Fiore report the 
marginal effects after the probit estimation and they do not consider a panel structure. Switchbonus: earnings from 
always switching minus earnings from always remaining. Switchwon: dummy variable equal to 1 if the decision maker 
switched and won the prize in the most recent period. Switchlost: is equal to 1 if and only if the decision maker switched 
in the preceding period but did not win the prize. 
   10
In table 1, we report marginal effects, since coefficients derived from models of this sort do not 
have the usual meaning and interpretation as in linear models, whereas marginal effects do have. 
The package we used in analysing our data reports the marginal effects at the sample means of the 
data for continuous variables, and for a discrete change from 0 to 1 for dummy variables.    
 
We observe that among the significant variables, Switchwon behaves as in the previous analysis, 
whereas Switchlost has the same magnitude, but it goes in the opposite direction. That means that 
we cannot confirm precisely directional learning theory, because our results are not unambiguous: 
the variable Switchwon indicates that the probability of switching is 34.67% higher if the subject 
chose to switch and won in the most recent period, as we expected, whereas Switchlost suggests that 
even if the subject chose to switch and lost in the preceding period, this fact increases the 
probability of switching by 27.35%. As regards the test for the other learning theory, reinforcement 
learning, the variable Switchbonus shows the expected direction and is more effective than in the 
previous analysis. 
The negative effect for Time would suggest a downward trend to switch, on the contrary, the 
positive effect for Time
2 would show that we have a non linear and convex trend over time, but 
neither of them are significant.  
Finally, as can be observed from the table, our last treatment, ForDummies, is significantly effective 
in increasing the probability of switching (by 12.11%).     
In conclusion, our results are quite in line with previous ones, except for the fact that learning is not 
explained by the variable Time nor by directional learning (however, also in Friedman Switchwon is 
never significant).  
 
5. Discussion 
In this section, we summarize our main results and present some possible explanations for the 
behaviour observed in our experiment. 
Considering the common explanations usually supported as likely candidates, already presented in 
section 2, we can point out that: 
(1) The misapplication of Bayes’rule is an important ingredient for this “anomaly”, but we showed 
that it is not the driving explanation for this. Indeed, if it were the real motivation for this anomaly, 
since in our FOR DUMMIES treatment no application of this rule was required, we should have 
observed no irrational behaviour under this treatment. Clearly, the sharp decline in the number of 
subjects that made an irrational choice across the three treatments may be attributed to the fact that 
in the last experimental set up the game was simpler. Therefore, for a certain percentage of 
population, the problem lies in an incorrect probability updating.  However, even in the last period,   11
still 25% of people did not make the rational choice. This fact drives us to look for further 
explanations. 
(2) Oppositely, the status quo bias seems to have a non negligible role in understanding such a 
behaviour, at least for that fraction of people that never chose to switch. People seem to attach a 
higher value to their previous chosen door and, consequently, they seem to consider their already 
chosen door as their endowment. Indeed, very interestingly, even in the FOR DUMMIES treatment, at 
least 15% of subjects never decided to switch. 
(3) The illusion of control, if on the one hand it could represent an explanation for the case in which 
subjects first face the game or when they undergo the game without repetition, it seems implausible 
in repeated experiments in which people have to opportunity to realize that actually the strategy of 
switching has a greater chance of winning with respect to the strategy of remaining (over all our 
treatments, only 38.71 percent of the choices of remaining were winners, whereas 65 percent of the 
choices of switching won);  
(4) Finally, as regards the probability matching behaviour, we have already tested for this 
hypothesis, but our data reject it.      
Additionally to the reason cited above, as a likely explanation, we can mention a kind of 
intertemporal inconsistency, i.e., subjects’ decisions at the different decision nodes as if related to 
different “selves”. Anyway, it is quite unlikely that people do the same “mistake” repeatedly over 
the 10 periods: at the end, in our new treatment, they should realise that they are given the double 
chance of winning after the first stage. 
   
6. Conclusion 
The main goal of our experiment is to create a simple experimental set up that preserved all the 
basic features of the so called Monty Hall’s problem, but such that subjects were not required to 
apply the Bayes’ rule. This experimental design enabled us to discriminate among the most cited 
explanations for this kind of anomaly. 
Our main results have been clear: the misapplication of Bayesian updating is important in reducing 
the “anomaly”, as we can derive from the monotonic increase of switch rate across the three 
treatments (the control that replicated exactly the structure of the game as in the TV programme and 
in the previous experiments, the second designed to test for monotonicity, but that is resulted not 
statistically distinct from the control, the new treatment in which subjects were simply required to 
choose  between one door or two  doors), but still, it does not appear as the leading explanation. In 
this sense, Monty Hall’s three doors anomaly has proved stronger than peviously thought.   12
Having discarded some other common suggested explanations (the illusion of control, the 
probability matching behaviour), now we can affirm that this anomaly, even if attenuated by design 
conditions, it is not a weak effect, but rather a systematic behavioural regularity. It could rely on 
some psychological underpinnings, such as the status quo bias. In this sense, a future line of 
research could be test for this effect. For example, a ‘super for dummies’ treatment could be 
implemented, in which subjects play only one stage in which they are required to choose among the 
possibility of one door or the possibility of two doors. In this case, the endowment effect would 
play no role. It is important to note that loss aversion, along with status quo bias, has proved to 
explain some other important phenomenon, such as the equity premium puzzle (see Camerer and 
Loewenstein, 2004 for a review).  Moreover, our data suggest that also some learning models could 
be helpful in understanding such phenomena (indeed, our data support to the reinforcement 
learning, so that switching would be chosen only when sufficient favourable evidence has been 
accumulated).   
Finally, these results could contribute to dismiss the idea that people actually use probabilities at all 
in making some kinds of decisions.      13
Appendix 
Instructions. - This experiment is designed to study how people make decisions. 
The experiment is very simple, and you will have the possibility of earning money, which will be paid to you in cash at 
the end of the experiment.  
This amount will depend, on the one hand, on your decisions and, on the other hand, on luck.  
The game is as simple as possible. 3 “cards” will appear on your screen: you will be asked to choose one of them 
simply pressing a button placed in the bottom right angle. During our experiment, each time the programme will 
establish in a complete random way which card is the winner one, i.e. the card behind which a prize is hidden. 
Whenever you choose the right card, you will win 0.5€, nothing otherwise.  
Still, in each period a second chance will be given to you: after you have chosen your first card, you will have two 
opportunities: or sticking with your already-chosen card or choosing both two remaining cards.  
At the end of each period, winning card and your correspondent earning will be shown to you with a message on your 
screen.  
This game will be repeated for 10 times, in addition to the 2 trial periods at the beginning. At the end, you will be paid  
your total payoff (trial periods excepted) and free to leave the laboratory. 
Rules are very simple. Communicating with other participants is forbidden (you can ask some questions to the 
experimenters only during trial periods), otherwise you will leave out from the laboratory and another player will be 
given your place in the experiment. 
Good luck! 
Trial Periods.-In order to test trial periods did not affect learning during subsequent periods, in the next table, we report 
maximum likelihood estimation in which data over these two periods in each treatment have been added. 
                                                   Table A 1: Marginal Effects from probit estimation 
Dep. Variable Switch  Trial and 
No Trial 
Periods 
Time  -0.0088 
(0.728) 
Time
2  0.0008 
(0.676) 
Switchbonus  0.0562 
(0.001) 
Switchwon  0.3580 
(0.000) 
Switchlost  0.2715 
(0.000) 
Intermediate  0.0161 
(0.734) 
ForDummies  0.1396 
 (0.004) 
  




                                 Notes:  The dependent variable is 1 in periods in which the subjects chose to switch and 0  
                                 otherwise.   14
If we compare these results with those in the last column of Table 2 above, we can note no notable differences, 
neither in the magnitude, nor in the direction, nor in the significance of the marginal effects. Consequently, we cannot 
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